Saturday August 1, 2009 - Vol. VIII Issue 8
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Dispersive Device; “Dirty Bomb”
Dr. John Nordin
One of the most difficult training exercises for
responders is how to deal with a radiological dispersive device or “dirty bomb”
incident. Unlike fires, explosions, or chemical spills, there aren’t past
examples where radioactive material has been actually dispersed by a terrorist
where responders can learn from the experience. Furthermore, how do we even
know that a radioactive material has been dispersed; if so, what radioactive
material and how much? One trainer came to AristaTek and asked for a simple
“widget” for converting gamma radiation counts, Curies, Becquerels, Roentgens,
Rads, etc. Grays, etc. to a measure of dose, e.g. Sieverts, or Rems. The units
by which radiation is measured in itself is bewildering. What are the chances
of a person exposed to radiation developing cancer later in life?
Definition of a Radiological Dispersive Device:
The Department of Homeland Security
defines a radiological dispersive device (RDD) as a combination of a
conventional explosive device with radioactive material, and is designed to
scatter this radioactive material over a general area. A RDD is also called a
“dirty bomb”. The context is that of terrorist(s) use to cause psychological
fear and economic disruption. It is also possible that a terrorist could rig
up a device using an aspirator to disperse the radioactive material in the form
of a fine powder or aerosol suspension into an intake air system without using
an explosive, and for that reason, responders should be alert to any
How Do You Know That a Radiological Dispersive Device Has Been Deployed?
There has been a suspicious incident, perhaps
resulting in an explosion, at a location where many people have gathered, or at
or near a high profile target. The area has or is being secured, any injured
removed or in the process of being removed, and people evacuated. There may or
may not be clues (e.g. suspicious canisters or containers, maybe lead
shielding) of a radiological dispersive device. Canisters could also be used
to contain a chemical or biological warfare agent, or someone could have stored
incompatible chemicals (e.g. a fuel and an oxidant) together without intent to
Responders will not know that a radiological
dispersive device has been deployed until radiation detection equipment
(usually a gamma radiation counter) has been brought to the scene. Hopefully
this is done quickly so that decontamination procedures and appropriate
personal protection equipment implemented for responders entering and leaving
the scene. An incident commander may still order these procedures, and medics
may decontaminate the injured brought to the hospital before radiation exposure
has been checked out. Responders should also be trained to recognize symptoms
of chemical exposure, which could also account for a suspicious release.
A gamma radiation detector can be used to detect
whether radioactive materials have been dispersed. The detector may simply
measure total radiation count within a certain energy level range or measure
radiation level counts at different energy levels.
Gamma radiation is only part of the total
electromagnetic spectrum which includes radio waves, microwaves, infrared,
visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, and gamma radiation. Gamma
radiation is the most energetic of electromagnetic radiation and is able to
penetrate human flesh; the gamma radiation energy interacts with flesh causing
it to ionize at the molecular level, disrupting the cell machinery which may
result in death. A sub-lethal dose may result in cancer later in life.
We are also surrounded by natural radiation. This
radiation comes from many sources, including the rocks and soils, natural
building materials, outer space, and trace residuals from nuclear tests
conducted many years ago. Figure 1 shows natural gamma radiation counter as
measured by a detector able to measure radiation at different energy levels,
and has operated for a period of time. Energy levels are measured in electron
volts (eV); 1000 eV = Kev; 1000 KeV = 1 MeV.
What happen if a radioactive isotope is released
into the air? We would get a spike in the number of counts at certain energy
levels. Each radioactive isotope has a characteristic energy level or levels
representing a “fingerprint” for that isotope. For example, cesium 137 (also
called Caesium 137 or Cs 137) emits gamma radiation at 660 KeV (0.66 MeV)
energy level. If the gamma radiation detector measured significant radiation
at 660 KeV above background, we would know Cesium 137 has been released.
Cobalt 60 (Co 60) emits gamma radiation at 1173.2 KeV (1.1732 MeV) and 1332.5
(1.3325 MeV) energy levels. Americium 241 emits radiation at several energy
levels: 59.5 KeV (35.9% of disintegrations), 13.9 KeV (43.5% of
disintegrations), and lesser amounts at 26.3 KeV and 33.2 KeV.
Many radioactive isotopes also emit alpha
particles. A few emit neutrons in the process of decay. Instrumentation can
be purchased to detect alpha particles and neutrons. This is also useful in
determination of the radioactive isotope released and also if a person is still
contaminated with radioactive debris. Gamma radiation detectors cannot
determine whether a person has been exposed to gamma radiation at some earlier
time if there is no radioactive debris present when the person is checked.
Can a responder take a bunch of radiation count
measurements at different locations and work backwards to estimate the total
amount to radioactive material released? Theoretically yes, but there are
other priorities such as determination of where contamination is located,
access control, decontamination of persons entering and leaving, and locating
who has been exposed. All this is required regardless of whether we know the
amount released. Sampling techniques to determine air quality (e.g. measuring units
Becquerels per cubic meter) and ground shine (deposited radiological material,
units Becquerels per square meter) are more sophisticated and best left to
specialists. A responder might best use radioactive detection equipment to
determine whether there has been an incident and approximate locations of
contamination and even identify the material.
Algeciras, Spain, Steel Mill Cesium 137 Release
This incident has been modeled by a number of
researchers, notably from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and the
Westinghouse Savannah River Company; the incident was also studied by several
European governmental organizations. Their reports are available over the
Internet (some require a subscription service to access technical
publications). This was not a terrorist incident but an accidental
incineration of cesium 137-contaminated material in an industrial furnace. We
make mention of the incident in this newsletter because modeling was done based
on ambient air quality measurements to estimate the amount of cesium 137
released at the source. In addition, the incident showed that even small
quantities of radioactive material released can be detected over wide
Notification of the accident began on 9 June 1998,
when the Swiss government announced that radiation levels up to 1000 times
background had been detected in their national monitoring network and that the
source was unknown. The excess radiation was also confirmed by monitoring
systems in France and Italy. On 10 June 1998, a steel mill in Algeciras,
Spain, notified the Spanish Nuclear Security Agency that they had detected
radiation in one of their oven filtration traps. On 12 June 1998, the Spanish
government announced that a medical radiotherapy source of cesium 137 was apparently
melted in the steel mill scrap metal furnace and released to the atmosphere,
and that the amount and time of the release was unknown, but late May was a
possible release time.
Governments and researchers made available to
modelers ambient air quality measurements taken during the May-June 1998 time
frame. The sampling time mostly varied from 24 hours to about 2 weeks
depending upon the sampling location (samples from France, Spain, Germany,
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovokia). The sampling consisted of passing
a measured volume of ambient air at generally a 1.5 meter height through a
filter for a period of time and then measuring the radioactivity collected by
the filter. Background radiation was on the order of maybe one micro Becquerels
per cubic meter of air sampled (μBq/m3
), more or less,
depending upon the location and volume of air sampled (a 0.5 μBq/m3
limit of detection was mentioned, at least for some stations). Measurements
varied from the limit of detection to over 1000 μBq/m3
upon the sampling time and location. Remember, different samplers operated for
different lengths of time so the concentrations represent an average
concentration during the time period sampled.
The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability scientists,
located at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL), took the many
measurements taken in Europe and coupled this information with U.S Navy
Operational Global Atmospheric Prediction System gridded data (uses a
combination of measured meteorological data and high resolution forecasting) to
develop a plume plot (Figure 2), which appeared in the LLNL report
UCRL-JC-131330 (available on the Internet at https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/240649.pdf
The plume modeling methodology involved looking at different source release
amounts and times and seeing which best matches what was measured at the
measuring stations. The modeling and weather information suggested that the
Cesium 137 plume cloud (very fine particulates) initially drifted eastward over
the Mediterranean Sea , then turned north into France and Italy, and was split
as it passed northward over the Alps with parts drifting into northern France,
Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Hungary.
The plume contour taken from the LLNL report is hard
to read, but the solid black areas represent locations > 1000 μBq/m3
dark cross-hatched shading (barely distinguishable from the solid black
shading) 500 to 1000 μBq/m3
, and the unshaded areas (only the
boundaries reproduced) represent 10 to 100 and 100 to 500 μBq/m3
Based on the modeling (figure 2), the LLNL
scientists results confirmed that the Spanish government estimate of a release
between 8 to 80 curies of Cesium 137 between 0300 and 0500 hours local time on
29 May was probably correct, with a 50 curie release best fitting the
monitoring data. The LLNL scientists further estimated the highest dose due to
20-day ground shine exposure to be 10-8
Rem (= 10-4
μSv), well below
any known health effect. We will talk about these units of measurements and
what they mean later.
Figure 2: Seven-day Average Contour Plot Developed
by Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability scientists at Lawrence Livermore
Robert Buckley at the Westinghouse Savannah River
Company in South Carolina also modeled the Cesium 137 release. His report
(WSRC-MS-99-00660) is available at http://sti.srs.gov/fulltext/ms9900660/ms9900660.html
Figure 3, Left, Integrated airborne
concentration near surface after six days. Black contour at southern part of
Spain represents concentrations of 106 μBq/m3.
The shading represents decreases in order of magnitude down to 100 μBq/m3
for the lightest shading. The modeling was based on a 80 curie release over
a 30-minute period. From WSRC-MS-00-00660 report.
How much is 80 (or 50) curies of Cesium 137? From
the PEAC tool, under radioactive isotopes, we can select Cesium 137.
At left is a partial view of the PEAC
tool screen. Under radiation we read that Cesium 137 has an activity of
86.6912 curies per gram (Ci = curies). We are talking roughly one gram of
Cesium 137 being dispersed in the atmosphere over a several hour period in
the Spain incident, yet scientists were able to measure Cesium 137
concentrations hundreds of miles away.
By comparison, the weight of a one
cent U.S. coin (minted after 1982) weighs 2.5 grams. We are talking about
only a small quantity of cesium 137.
The gamma radiation energy is also
displayed (661.6 KeV or 0.6616 MeV). The half life is 30.2 years, meaning,
that after 30.2 years, Cesium 137 will have decayed to Barium 137 which is
Scrolling further down the screen, we can
pull up additional information about Cesium 137. Under daughter species,
Cesium 137 decays to Barium 137 which is stable (we won’t count the
intermediate Barium 137m which has a half life of only 2.55 minutes).
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency
(and Occupational Safety and Health Administration) recommends that a person
receive no more than 5 rem dose per year. This does not include normal
background radiation which might be 0.15 to 0.2 rem per year for a non-smoker
at sea level, and excluding radon gas exposure. The total amount of cesium
137 inhaled to result in an equivalent 5 rem dose is 2.0e-008 microcuries
Since the modeling study was done
using ambient air concentration in metric units, we might select the metric
rather than English option for the PEAC tool, as below:
The dose as shown in the display at
left is listed in sieverts (0.05 sievert =5 rem), and the amount of cesium
137 inhaled equivalent to a 0.05 sievert dose is 7.4e+006 Becquerels [7.4 106
The highest concentrations modeled were on the order
from the Westinghouse Savannah River Company in southern Spain. Assuming that
the plume cloud in southern Spain lasted over say a 24-hour period and the
average person breathing rate was 20 liters/minute, a person would have inhaled
28.8 cubic meters of air in a day. At concentrations of 1 Bq/m3
are looking at an exposure of 5x(28.8/(7.4x106
) = 2 x 10-5
rem, which is well below the 5 rem recommended annual exposure limit.
While the Algeciras incident in itself did not
result in danger to human populations, a terrorist might release say 100 grams
of Cesium 137 or multiple containers of this material resulting in a great deal
How Do You Convert Amount of Radiation
We tossed around a bunch of different units, Curies,
Becquerels, Rems, Sieverts, and added a bunch of abbreviations, and
concentrations, e.g., Bq/m3
Ci, etc., not to mention a bunch of other units and symbols that appear in
print. This can be confusing to someone not familiar to terminology relating
to radioactivity. Some definitions are in order:
1. Definitions of Radiological Units
A measure of activity of a radioactive
material (radioactive isotope) in the International System (SI) of units.
One Becquerel = 1 disintegration/second
1000000 μBq = 1 Bq
1000000 Bq = 1 MBq
1000 MBq = 1 GBq
A measure of activity of a radioactive
material (radioactive isotope) commonly used in the United States and some
other countries. One curie = 3.7 x 1010 Becquerel; 1 Ci = 37 GBq
1000 mCi = 1 Ci
A measure of exposure (absorbed dose)
due to gamma and X-rays emitted by a radioactive material in air. This unit
is commonly used in the United States. One roentgen of absorbed dose equals
2.58 x 10-4 coulombs per kilogram
Rad = radiation absorbed dose. A rad
is the amount of radiation energy absorbed in some material, and can refer to
any type of radiation, and is equal to the absorption of 100 ergs per gram of
material. For X-rays and gamma radiation, one Roentgen = 0.88 rad.
A Gray is the amount of radiation
energy absorbed in some material, and can refer to any type of radiation, and
is equal to the absorption of one joule per gram of material. One Gray = 100
rads for X-rays and gamma rays. This is the International System (SI) unit
for measuring absorbed radiation.
Rem = roentgen equivalent man. A rem
is the amount of radiation energy absorbed by human tissue and takes into
account the effective biological damage of the radiation. Rads can be
converted to rems by multiplying by a quality factor which is unique to the
type of radiation. Unit used commonly in the United States.
A Sievert is the amount of radiation
energy absorbed by human tissue and takes into account the effective
biological damage of the radiation. Grays can be converted to Sieverts by
multiplying by a quality factor which is unique to the type of radiation.
One sievert = 100 rem. International System (SI) of units.
Any of these units may have prefixes which introduce
some factor of ten, usually in multiples of 1000:
Curies and becquerels are measurements of amount of
radiation emitted by radioactive materials. Roentgens, rads, and grays are
measurements of the amount of radiation emitted which is absorbed by another
material, which could be a human or animal or inanimate object and does not
take into account adverse biological effects. Rems and sieverts are
measurements of the dose (radiation absorbed) which takes into account the
adverse biological effects.
How do you convert the amount of radiation (units of
curies or becquerels) to dose received by a human (units of rems or sieverts)?
The answer is lookup-up tables which have been worked out by scientists and are
in the public domain.
Roentgens, rads, and grays might be thought of as an
intermediate step in the conversion of curies and becquerels to dose as
measured in rems or sieverts. To facilitate use of lookup tables, this
intermediate step is omitted in look-up tables allowing the user to convert the
amount of radiation to dose.
To use the tables, the user must know (1) the
radioactive isotope or isotopes and (2) how the person is exposed. Exposure
routes may be external (e.g. by submersion, ground shine, or from a source a
specified distance away from a person) or internal (by inhalation or
Some of the published conversion factors are listed
in the PEAC tool when the user pulls up a radioactive isotope. The dose due to
a radioactive source a specified distance away is also available as a
calculator within the PEAC tool.
Tables presenting dose due to inhalation or
ingestion are published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations under 10 CFR
Part 20 Appendix B. The user must identify the radioactive isotope and amount,
and the tables present a dose constant (which includes the effect of daughter
isotopes formed through radioactive decay) which can be adjusted for exposure
time, breathing rate, or ingestion, or back-calculated to give the amount
equivalent to a 5 rem annual dose.
Other tables in following documents:
U. S. Department of Energy (July,
1988), Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the
, National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of
L.M.; and D.K. Trubey, (1982), Specific
Gamma-Ray Dose Constants for Nuclides Important to Dosimetry and
, ORNL/RSIC-45/R1, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
K.F. Eckerman, A.B. Wolbarst, and
A.C.B. Richardson, 1988, Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air
Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and
, Federal Guidance Report No. 11, EPA-5201/1-88-020, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.
Report No. 13, Cancer Risk Coefficients for Environmental Exposure to Radionuclide
EPA 402-R-99-001, September 1999.
As an approximation, if specific
radioactive isotope information is lacking, the Federal Guidance Report No. 13
report provides (assuming low dose total uniform radiation of the body over a
30-year period, estimates on the conservative side) an increased lifetime
incident cancer risk factor of 0.08 per sievert, or a mortality cancer risk
factor of 0.06 per sievert (recall 100 rem = 1 sievert). Short term, higher
dose exposure may result in different risk factors.
Any “widget” converting
amount of radiation (curies, becquerels) to dose (rems, sieverts) and
associated lifetime cancer risk would include information from these documents
or its updates.
Protective Action Guides for
Radiological Dispersive Device
As an example, the PEAC tool contains
a calculator where the user specifies the radioactive isotope and activity;
in this example displayed the user is asked to calculate a distance (in
meters) from a 20000 GBq source of cesium 137 in which he/she would receive a
1 mSv dose in one hour. The ORNL/RSIC-45/R1 document information cited above
was used in constructing this calculator.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has issued
a directorate for responding to a Radiological
Dispersive Device incident in the Federal Register
dated January 3,
2006. The full text can be obtained at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/thd/repp_rdd_pag.pdf
The text also includes responding to Improvised Nuclear Device Incidents. An
update is published in the Federal Register dated August 1, 2008, the full text
of which is available at http://www.fema.gov/good_guidance/download/10260
In 1992, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency issued Protective Action Guides for responding to Nuclear
Incidents. This report is no longer available in hard copy. While the
emphasis of the document is on Nuclear Power Plant accidents, the Department
of Homeland Security (see Jan 3, 1006 Federal Register) said that the document
is appropriate for radiological dispersive devices which a terrorist might
use. Updates are in the making, the status of the updates and an electronic
version of the 1992 document is available at
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security also cites
cancer risks from the Federal Guidance Report No. 13,
saying that the increased cancer fatality risk for a worker is 0.0006 per rem
(0.06 per sievert). This means that the fatal cancer risk for a worker exposed
to 10 rem is 0.6% (six cases per 1000 persons exposed). Because the cancer may
not show up until maybe 20 or 30 years later, a younger person is more likely
to die a premature death from cancer than an older person. For example, 20 to
30 year olds exposed to a single 25 rem dose have a 9.1 per 1000 risk of
premature cancer death while 40 to 50 year old exposed to the same dose have a
5.3 per 1000 risk of premature cancer death. Remember that doses are
accumulative, meaning if the person is exposed again in an incident maybe a
year later that risk of premature cancer death is added as we are looking at a
total lifetime rem dose exposure.
The term “Total effective dose
equivalent” or TEDE refers to the sum of exposure due to submersion, ground
shine, inhalation, and ingestion.
The federal guidelines for worker
response to a radiological dispersive device incident (from the the Federal
citations are listed in table 2:
Table 2. Response Worker Guidelines
Total TEDE Guideline
All occupational exposures
All reasonably achievable
actions have been taken to minimize dose
property necessary for public welfare
Exceeding 5 rems
unavoidable and all appropriate actions taken to reduce dose. Monitoring
available to project or measure dose. Any Dose > 5 rem is done on a
voluntary basis with responders understanding the risks involved.
Lifesaving or protection
of large populations
Exceeding 5 rems
unavoidable and all appropriate actions taken to reduce dose. Monitoring
available to project or measure dose. Any Dose > 5 rem is done on a
voluntary basis with responders understanding the risks involved.
problem is that especially during the early phases of an incident responders
will probably not know that a radioactive dispersal devise has been used by a
terrorist until the scene has been checked using a gamma radiation counter.
The duty of responders is to secure the area, engage in life-saving operations,
prevent public access, evacuation of the public or shelter in place, and
engaging in fire-fighting operations. Responders could be exposed to doses
greater than 5 rem and not even know it. These actions on the part of
responders are part of a necessary response to any incident. The incident
commander may elect to take precautionary actions to minimize exposure and
spread of contamination even before the scene is checked out for radiation.
Precautionary action might include respiratory protection to minimize
inhalation of dust and maybe jump suits which are removed when the responders
leave the area. If the area is found later to be contaminated, it will not be
easy to determine the dose exposure, or to track down the public which may have
been exposed, or to clean up radiological dust dispersed off site.
Protective Action Guides do not provide any
information to responders on how to determine levels of radiation or dose
exposure, only that the exposure should not exceed guideline levels (table 2)
and efforts should be made to minimize exposure and spread of contamination.
Three time phases are recognized in response to a radiological
dispersive device incident.
Early Phase (Emergency Phase):
early phase takes place at the beginning of an incident when immediate
decisions must be made as to effective protection actions, and before field
measurements on radiation are available. If an explosive RDD is deployed,
there may be no time to take protective actions to significantly reduce dust
cloud plume exposure. In the case of a covert dispersal, discovery or
detection may not occur for days or weeks allowing contamination to be
dispersed by foot and vehicular traffic and by weather. Priority should be
given to lifesaving and first-aid actions. Early protective actions should be
taken very quickly which can be modified later as more information becomes
Expected initial protective actions will include steps common to
any incident where an explosion or possible chemical release has occurred
including establishing a “hot zone” , controlling public access, life saving
operations, first aid, and fire-fighting if applicable. Decisions must be made
whether to evacuate the public or shelter in place, fitting responders with
respiratory protection, protective suits, and other actions.
The EPA Protective Action Guide recommends 1 to
5 rem maximum dose for evacuation of the public or sheltering in place, during
the early phase, but again the responders will not know locations linked to
an incident occurs as the result of an explosion, anything that can be done to
reduce inhalation of dust, even breathing through a wet cloth held to the face
or moving quickly to an area outside the dust cloud will help.
The modeling for the
Cesium 137 release over Europe from Algeciras, Spain, looks impressive but the
concentrations and dose were many orders of magnitude less than what might
cause public harm. If we are talking about a theft of radiological isotope
used in industry for use in a radiological dispersive device, the quantity
involved would probably be less than one gram or 100 curies. Initial public
evacuation might be limited to maybe a few city blocks or even a single
building for <1 rem exposure as a precaution until measurements can be
taken. The use of radioactive isotopes in industry is very well controlled; it
would be difficult for a terrorist to acquire a large amount of material from
This phase begins after a radiological incident has
been established, the isotope(s) identified, and protective action decisions
can be made based on some field measurements. The dust from any plume cloud
has generally settled (although wind or other activity might resuspend dust).
The period at which the intermediate phase begins might start anywhere from a
few hours to days after the release and may continue for weeks or even months.
Activities may include readjustment of public protective action distances based
on field measurements, identify locations of contamination, refinements of
control of access, reopening transportation and infrastructure, locate people
which may have been exposed, cleanup of spots where radiation has been tracked
off site, and possible reentry to homes and locations previously evacuated.
EPA Protective Action Guide recommends a 5 rem per year maximum dose for
response worker exposure during the intermediate phase. The public is allowed
to return to occupy locations if the dose is less than 2 rem for the first year
and 500 mrem (0.5 rem) per year for subsequent years. Drinking water dose
should not exceed 500 mrem (0.5 rem) per year. These are the recommended
guidelines in determining relocation or the public and reentry to homes.
use of dose reduction techniques is recommended for personal property and
potentially contaminated areas that continue to be occupied. This includes
washing of contaminated vehicles, personal clothing before reuse, cleaning
eating utensils and food preparation areas before the next use, and other
personal property as appropriate.
The late phase involves final cleanup of areas
and personal property where radioactive material is present. There will be
more time to establish locations of contamination and how to clean up and
locate a disposal site for the contamination. Each situation will be
different, and the objective will be site restoration. No guidelines for
exposure are presented in the EPA Protective Action Guide other than a general
statement that the dose for the general public should not exceed 500 mrem (0.5
rem) per year.
· Issue 35, February 2005. Radioactive Substances and Illicit Materials
· Issue 21, January 2004. Radioactive Isotopes